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ABSTRACT 
As current democratic governments are unsuccessful in fulfilling our moral obligations to future 
generations, future-focused institutions aim to adapt our democracy to neutralise this short-
termism. However, it often appears to be impossible for future-focused institutions to be both 
effective and democratically legitimate. This thesis aims to resolve this dilemma by arguing for 
strong external representatives, representatives of future generations outside of legislative 
assemblies that have a strong mandate to veto laws that have a strong negative impact on future 
generations. To claim that this is not only effective but also democratically legitimate, this thesis 
analyses the most influential theories on the boundaries of the demos, the All Affected Interests 
Principle and Democratic Values Theory, and demonstrates that they require the inclusion of 
future generations by means of a strong-mandated representative. Finally, this thesis also 
provides several desiderata on how strong external representatives should be instituted and 
discusses its political feasibility.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The effects of current policies on the future of our planet are gigantic, yet the future generations 
who will suffer their consequences do not yet exist to fight against these threats. Current 
democratic governments appear to be focused on short-term successes and are ineffective in 
incorporating the interests of future generations. To solve this problem, there are several 
proposals that aim to adapt our democratic system to make it more future-focused.1 For these 
future-focused institutions to be successful, they need to satisfy two separate moral 
requirements: (1) they should be effective in fulfilling our moral obligations and (2) they should 
be democratically legitimate. The central dilemma of this thesis is the tension between these two 
requirements; how these future-focused institutions can be both effective and legitimate. 
To better illustrate this tension, we must look at the role of political power. If these 
institutions hold little to no political power and are thus non-binding institutions,2 it is unlikely 
that they will be effective in changing policies. Therefore, we may assume that these institutions 
require some level of political power to counterbalance motivational and institutional problems 
that make current democracies apt to focus on the short-term. Simultaneously, a basic notion of 
democratic legitimacy would hold that (current) citizens of a state make a decision in a 
democratic way; this would exclude future generations from having political power. Therefore, 
non-binding, advisory institutions would not face any legitimacy concerns, but the more political 
power we give to future generations, the stronger this concern would be. This creates an Inverse 
Relation Problem: 
 
Inverse Relation Problem 
Premiss 1: The more political power a future-focused institution has, the more 
effective it will be in fulfilling our moral obligations to future generations. 
Premiss 2: The more political power a future-focused institution has, the more 
democratically illegitimate it will be. 
Conclusion: The more effective a future-focused institution aims to be, the more 
democratically illegitimate it will be. 
 
1 I will use future-focused throughout this thesis to describe institutions or policies that are aimed at 
serving the interests of future generations. There might be small differences between future-focused, 
future-beneficial and future-oriented, but I will not use this distinction and only refer to the first term. See 
González-Ricoy and Gosseries, “Designing Institutions for Future Generations: An Introduction,” 6. 
2 González-Ricoy and Gosseries use the term “non-binding” institution in relation to the proposal of the 
Ombudsman; they argue that it may “not raise any legitimacy concerns”, because it involves “merely 
advisory powers”. González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 17–19. 
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If we combine this notion of the Inverse Relation Problem with the earlier assumption that we 
require future-focused institutions to be both democratically legitimate and effective, then we 
will reach, what I will call the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma: 
 
Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma 
Premiss 1: Future-focused institutions should be democratically legitimate 
Premiss 2: They should be effective in fulfilling our obligations to future generations 
Premiss 3: The more effective a future-focused institution aims to be, the more 
democratically illegitimate it will be (Conclusion of the Inverse Relation Problem) 
Conclusion: We need to prioritise either democratic legitimacy or effectiveness 
 
Even though philosophers have never analysed this dilemma specifically, several proposals for 
future-focused institutions have made an implicit prioritisation.3 The aim of this thesis is to 
disprove the idea of the Inverse Relation Problem, thus allowing for the creation of a future-
focused institution that is both democratically legitimate and effective. I will do so by attacking 
the second premiss of the Inverse Relation Problem, i.e. I will argue that it can be democratically 
legitimate to give political power to a future-focused institution. I will do so by analysing 
influential theories on democratic boundaries to demonstrate that they require the inclusion of 
future generations by means of a representative that has sufficient political power. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis will address whether we have moral obligations towards future 
generations. Chapter 2 will discuss why governments often focus on the short term and how we 
can neutralise that. Chapter 3 will then propose one specific future-focused institution, the 
representation of future generations, and it will argue that if we properly understand major 
democratic theories, it is legitimate to institute representatives. This chapter will also provide 
several desiderata that could help strengthen these representatives. Finally, Chapter 4 will argue 
that strong external representation is the most effective solution to incorporate these desiderata 
and it will explain why it is also a feasible proposal. 
Two specific concepts require some further clarification. Firstly, this thesis will solely 
focus on non-overlapping generations, as they face different moral questions than overlapping 
 
3 The title of this thesis is a nod to Beckman and Uggla’s article who argue that they combine both issues, 
but propose a non-binding institution and only hope that if it is instituted properly, it could have some 
political power. Beckman and Uggla, “An Ombudsman for Future Generations: Legitimate and Effective?” 
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generations4 and have no other chance to make their preferences heard5; this thesis will not 
distinguish between distant and remote non-overlapping generations. Secondly, this thesis 
focuses on the environmental concerns of future generations. This does not imply that future 
generations have no other concerns, but environmental threats are often most alarming and 
irreversible, and they might even destroy all human life. Therefore, referring to these specific 
concerns can also strengthen our moral and democratic obligations to future generations.  
 
4 To read more about the different philosophical dilemmas between overlapping and non-overlapping 
generations, see Meijers, “Justice Between Generations.” 
5 Agents that already exist, like young children, often already have certain rights and there are clearer 
democratic institutions present to represent their interests, there is even a European Network of 
Ombudspersons for Children (ENOC). 
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CHAPTER 1: ON MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM 
Current governments have more influence on the lives of future generations than ever before, 
while their decisions will never influence us. There is thus a strong asymmetrical power-relation 
between present and future generations: our decisions can seriously reduce the capacity of 
future generations and, in the most extreme case, we could even threaten their very existence. 
Although we cannot know exactly what the lives of these future generations will look like, 
science has told us more about how our current behaviour is effecting the future well-being of 
potential future citizens. These future generations are by definition not present right now and 
thus they cannot have a voice in decisions that are made about them and we cannot cooperate 
with them. In addition, the more we learn about the challenges and perils of climate change, the 
more pressing the philosophical question becomes whether we are morally obliged to prevent 
such perils from happening. 
This raises the philosophical question whether we owe moral obligations to future 
generations. This thesis will assume that we do have such obligations, as it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to give a complete philosophical account of intergenerational justice.6 In this first 
chapter I will therefore only briefly address the most prominent objection to granting future 
generations moral autonomy, the Non-Identity Problem, and give some possible responses. 
Furthermore, I will briefly say something about the contents of our obligations towards future 
generations. 
 
Assumption 1: We do have moral obligations towards future generations 
 
1.1 THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM 
Derek Parfit’s (1984) theory of the ‘Non-Identity Problem’ rests upon the idea that our actions 
determine which future people will exist.7 Parfit holds that if an individual would have been 
born a month later out of a different ‘ovum and spermatozoon’, this would have been an entirely 
different individual. When our moral theory relies on a person-affecting principle8, then there is 
 
6 For a broader analysis of all the philosophical challenges regarding future generations, see for example 
Meijers, “Justice Between Generations.” 
7 “The non-identity problem rests upon the contingency of future people upon currently living people’s 
decisions and actions. We know, of course, that when we harm future people’s interests and violate their 
rights, specific persons are harmed. But the decision we make often counts as a necessary condition of the 
very existence of this genetically and numerically specific set of people at some future point in time.” 
Meyer and Roser, “Enough for the Future,” 226–27. 
8 Meijers clarifies that “[t]he nonidentity problem is a challenge for all moral theories that rely on 
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no difference between conserving or depleting our planet9, as “in the different outcomes, 
different people would exist”10 and we can only compare different situations for one particular 
person and not the differences between different people. It is therefore not harmful to any future 
individual to live in a suboptimal state, if the alternative for them is not to have existed.11  
Many different approaches have been proposed to solve Parfit’s problem12; some have 
dropped the person-affecting principle13, and others argued that we had no obligations to future 
generations, but obligations concerning future generations14. This thesis lacks the depth to do 
justice to all aspects of this problem. However, as this thesis assumes that we have moral 
obligations towards future generations, it also needs to assume that there is a solution to the 
Non-Identity Problem. In order to show that this is a reasonable assumption to make, I will 
present two promising solutions. Firstly, there is the threshold conception of harm, the idea that 
future generations are harmed if their well-being is below a certain threshold.15 This avoids the 
Non-Identity Problem, as a situation is harmful when any future individual “falls under a 
normatively defined threshold”16, regardless of how it would have been in any other situation.17  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the person-affecting principle: something can only be bad (or good) if it is bad (or good) for someone.” 
Meijers, “Justice Between Generations,” 8. 
9 Parfit uses this Depletion-case to show that depleting our planet harms nobody even though “millions of 
people have, for several centuries, a much lower quality of life”, as in a world where we had opted for 
Conservation, “these particular people would never have existed.” Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 361–63. 
10 Parfit, 378. 
11 “With respect to persons whose existence is dependent upon the allegedly harming action, they cannot 
be worse off owing to this action than they would have been had this action not been carried out, for in 
that case they would not have existed.” Meyer and Roser, “Enough for the Future,” 227. 
12 To name a few, Deryck Beyleveld (2016) uses Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency to argue 
that “we must recognize duties to future generations on account of the rights they will have”, Beyleveld, 
“The Duties We Have to Future Generations : A Gewirthian Approach”; Rutger Claassen (2016) employs a 
capability theory of justice to argue “that we can extend capability protection to future generations by 
ascribing to them the same capabilities that current generations have”, Claassen, “Ecological Rights of 
Future Generations. A Capability Approach”; finally, it is also argued that present generations lack the 
right to severely harm future generations, e.g. “no individual can claim an unconditional right to destroy 
environmental goods”. Beekman, “Sustainable Development and Future Generations.” 
13 There are several harm-independent or non-consequentialist theories that avoid the NIP, because they 
argue that a person is harmed when one of his rights is violated, even if he is not actually worse off, see 
Woodward, “The Non-Identity Problem”; Velleman, “III. Love and Nonexistence”; Vrousalis, “Smuggled 
into Existence: Nonconsequentialism, Procreation, and Wrongful Disability.” 
14 Meijers clarifies that these theories argue that “the currently adult population has obligations of justice 
to the currently young, and the currently young will have an obligation to the young when they are 
adults.” Meijers, “Justice Between Generations,” 13. For more on this, see Gosseries, “On Future 
Generations’ Future Rights*”; Gheaus, “The Right to Parent and Duties Concerning Future Generations.”  
15 In this theory, future generations are harmed when they live in a depleted environment, even when the 
alternative is non-existence. Meyer and Roser explain that “we have a general duty to people not to cause 
them to be worse off than they ought to be” Meyer and Roser, “Enough for the Future,” 229. 
16 Meyer and Roser, 228. 
17 For more on the threshold notion of harm, see Meyer and Roser, “Enough for the Future”; Meyer, “Past 
and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm”; Rivera-López, “Individual Procreative 
Responsibility and the Non-Identity Problem.” 
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This first solution sticks to the person-affecting principle in the narrow sense, but an 
alternative solution is a wide person-affecting principle, which incorporates the well-being of 
different groups of future people and thus enables us to compare different groups of future 
people.18 This solves the Non-Identity Problem, but runs into a new problem: the Repugnant 
Conclusion,19 the problem that, theoretically, a billion miserable lives could outweigh a million 
happy ones in terms of total well-being. Derek Parfit, who formulated the Non-Identity Problem, 
eventually adopts this approach in his later work20 and argues that we can overcome the 
Repugnant Conclusion by combining it with a dual approach: he calls this the Wide Dual Person-
Affecting Principle21. Parfit thereby combines collectivity, “giving people a greater total sum of 
benefits”, with individuality, “the outcome would benefit each person more”22; thereby 
combining the best of two worlds.23 I personally prefer the latter, but for now it is only 
important that we can assume that there is at least a solution to the Non-Identity Problem. 
 
Assumption 1a: There is a solution to the Non-Identity Problem 
 
1.2 WHAT DO OWE FUTURE GENERATIONS? 
When this thesis assumes that we have a duty towards future generations, a secondary question 
arises: what does that duty entail? What level of well-being do we have to assure for future 
generations or above what threshold does their well-being need to be? The central argument of 
this thesis works for different political theories regarding this topic, but I believe it is useful to 
 
18 Parfit explains that in a narrow sense “worse for people” would mean that “‘the occurrence of X rather 
than Y would be either worse for, or bad for, the X-people”, while in the wide sense “the occurrence of X 
would be less good for the X-people than the occurrence of Y would be for the Y-people.” He concludes 
that the narrow principle “cannot solve the Non-Identity Problem”, while the wide principle can. Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons, 395–96. 
19 Parfit described this as: “[f]or any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high 
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are 
equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.” Parfit, 388. 
20 Parfit’s 2011-book Parfit, On What Matters: Volume Two (as quoted by Meijers, “Justice Between 
Generations.”) already opted for a wide person-affecting approach. A few hours before he died, on January 
1st, 2017, he finished the first draft of another interesting article on the matter. Jeff McMahan and Larry 
Temkin, who were both referred to in his article, helped finish the article and it was published in 
September that year. Parfit, “Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles.” 
21 “One of two outcomes would be in one way better if this outcome would together benefit people more, 
and in another way better if this outcome would benefit each person more.” Parfit, “Future People, the 
Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles,” 154. 
22 Parfit, 153. 
23 As Parfit puts it, “great losses in the quality of people’s lives could not be outweighed by any increase in 
the sum of benefits, if these benefits came in the lives of people whose quality of life would be much 
lower.” Parfit, 157. 
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clarify which solutions to the ‘Pattern, Metric and Scope’-metric24 this thesis will assume. Firstly, 
the Pattern-question discusses how much we owe future generations25; this thesis will adopt a 
sufficientarian approach, not because it is flawless26, but because many people could agree that 
we should at least27 provide future generations with sufficient well-being.28  
Secondly, if future generations must have a sufficient amount of X, what is that X? This is 
the Metric-question29 and this thesis will assume a molecular metric, in which future generations 
have “a list of heterogeneous elements, which includes capabilities, functionings, satisfaction of 
preferences, etc.”, which combines the strengths of several theories30. Vrousalis argues that even 
though the contents of these lists are highly uncertain, it is “unlikely that the best list we can 
come up with will contain suffering, substantial natural or genetic degradation, eradication of 
capabilities there is reason to value, and so on.”31  
Finally, there is the Scope-question, which discusses whether there are moral differences 
between different scopes of time.32 This thesis will adopt a chronopolitan approach that holds 
that there is no such difference, just like there is no moral difference between harming someone 
next to you or someone far way (spatial difference).33 If it is immoral to create an imminent 
nuclear threat to a generation 200 years from now, it is just as immoral to do the same to a 
generation 400 years from now.  
 
24 I use the distinction and terminology from Vrousalis, “Intergenerational Justice: A Primer.” See also 
Meijers, “Justice Between Generations.” for a broader analysis of the Pattern and Metric-debates. 
25 There are many different theories to compare this. Egalitarians believe that future people should be 
equally well off, sufficientarians argue for “a sufficiently good condition” and prioritarians, a specific type 
of utilitarianism with a focus on the well-being of the people who are worst off, "claim that 
intergenerational transfers to equally well off, or worse off, generations are normally justified. Vrousalis, 
“Intergenerational Justice: A Primer,” 50–53. 
26 Vrousalis correctly points out that this approach could support the destruction of all surplus resources 
above the threshold. 
27 It is important to note the words ‘at least’, to point out that it might indeed be beneficial to provide 
future generations with a higher quality of life, alike an egalitarian approach, but it is not necessary for 
this thesis to depend on this higher threshold. 
28 Meijers also notes that this principle is often used in combination with a wide-person affecting view, as 
“they tend to focus on the generic requirements for respecting what needs respecting in future people 
(dignity, reasonableness, human flourishing) rather than how much ends up with particular people.” 
Meijers, “Justice Between Generations,” 18. 
29 Here there are also many different theories Preferentialists believe that we should cater to the 
preference satisfaction of future generations; resourcists want every generation to have sufficient 
resources; Amartya Sen’s capability approach involves a broader concept of ‘capabilities’ or ‘positive 
freedoms’ that every generation should have. Vrousalis, “Intergenerational Justice: A Primer.” 
30 Vrousalis argues that it is too narrow to measure human flourishing solely by analysing people’s 
preferences or resources. On the other hand, the capability approach is too broad, as it fails to incorporate 
preferentialist considerations. Vrousalis, 55–58. 
31 Vrousalis, 58. 
32 Vrousalis distinguishes between generationalism, “justice extends only a couple of generations down 
the line”, or chronopolitanism, “justice requires treating all generations equally”. Vrousalis, 59. 
33 Vrousalis points to an example by Parfit, where you shoot an arrow into a distant wood and by accident 
hit someone: “Because this person is far away, I cannot identify the person whom I harm. But this is no 
excuse. Nor is it any excuse that this person is far away. We should make the same claims about effects on 
people who are temporally remote.” Derek Parfit, as quoted by Vrousalis, 59. 
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Assumption 1b: A sufficientarian pattern, molecular metric, and chronopolitan scope are satisfying 
in describing our intergenerational duties 
 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
This first chapter has dealt with the underlying assumption of this thesis that we have moral 
obligations towards future generations. As they do not yet exist, the Non-Identity Problem could 
imply that this assumption is wrong. I therefore had to assume that there is a satisfying answer 
to this problem; theories such as the threshold notion of harm or the Wide Dual Person-Affecting 
Principle, make it reasonable to make this second assumption. Lastly, I assumed that a a 
sufficientarian pattern – providing future generations with at least a sufficient amount of well-
being – a molecular metric – measuring well-being by combining different elements, such as 
capabilities and preferences – and a chronopolitan scope – treating all generations equally – are 
satisfying in describing our intergenerational duties.  
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CHAPTER 2: ON SHORT-TERMISM AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT 
The first chapter assumed that we have moral obligations to future generations, which implies 
that governments, who are normally the primary actor of justice, who have big financial assets 
for investments and whose focus should be on the public benefit, should act on this obligation. 
However, so far almost all governments have been very ineffective in doing so, e.g. in combating 
the threats of climate change.34 This thesis will assume that democratic governments are 
institutionally focused on the short-term: short-termism. §2.1 will analyse different sources that 
cause this and then §2.2 will discuss potential solutions. After that, §2.3 will discuss whether 
these solutions could become contentious with democratic theory and face possible democratic 
legitimacy concerns. 
 
Assumption 2: Democratic governments are short-termist 
 
2.1 FOUR SOURCES OF SHORT-TERMISM 
Short-termism (or presentism) is the tendency of current governments to have a strong focus on 
the ‘present’ and of laws to be biased towards the present.35 This is a natural human tendency, as 
most humans prefer the immediate to the distant, and it is not necessarily problematic; it is 
essential that a democracy values the lives of its citizens and their interests. However, it can 
cause serious problems for future generations if it makes us neglect our obligations to future 
generations. Therefore the ambition should not be to produce a long-termist government, but to 
neutralise the negative effects of short-termism in order to balance short-term and long-term 
effects. I will use Michael MacKenzie’s (2016) categorisation of the four different sources of 
short-termism: voters, politicians, special interest groups and the absence of future generations. 
Firstly, voters can decide every few years which political parties or candidates will 
represent them and their votes will influence how future-focused governments will be. As “most 
citizens tend to discount the future”36, they are likely to support parties that are short-termist. It 
is up to debate whether these preferences are fixed or that we “can help encourage longer-term 
 
34 To give just a few examples: global CO2-emissions are still rising , the Paris Agreement falls short in 
reaching its own objectives, and the world’s second largest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States, 
removed itself from this Agreement .“Analysis”; Dennis and Mooney, “Countries Made Only Modest 
Climate-Change Promises in Paris. They’re Falling Short Anyway.”; Milman, Carrington, and Smith, 
“Donald Trump Confirms US Will Quit Paris Climate Agreement.” 
35 Thompson, “Representing Future Generations: Political Presentism and Democratic Trusteeship.” 
36 Thompson, 17. 
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thinking”.37 We have seen a rise in support for Green Parties and even Animal Parties in some 
Western-European countries, but their influence remains limited. 
Secondly, politicians are elected by these voters and might therefore cater to their 
wishes. But even if we see politicians as professionals who make informed judgments based on 
impartial expertise, there are still institutional reasons why they are short-termist. Firstly, they 
want to show “demonstrable benefits over the near term, even if voters are, in principle, willing 
to pay near-term costs for longer-term benefits”38, especially when facing re-election. Secondly, 
their work focuses on current events, since they debate current policies and news stories. This 
has become more problematic in recent years due to “the intense pressures on politicians 
generated by media demands and public expectations for them to respond almost instantly to 
events.”39 
Thirdly, special interest groups lobby to influence political decision-making and the two 
most influential ones are incentivised to advocate short-termism. Firstly, big companies have a 
strong influence on politics, as they can use most capital and represent most workers. Especially 
energy and natural resources companies do not support important environmental legislation. 
Secondly, older generations are growing larger in number, have a high voter turn-out, and hold 
more political offices; simultaneously, they seem more short-termist, as “they are not (as) likely 
to pay the longer-term costs of today’s actions”.40 It is, however, debatable whether the policy 
preferences of these older generations really differ.41 
Lastly, the absence of future generations also causes short-termism, as they cannot 
defend or lobby for their interests. They also lack a ‘natural representative’ and even if they had 
representation, this faces problems of authorisation and accountability, and we lack knowledge 
about their (possibly diverse) interests – more on this in the next chapters. Concluding, 
democratic systems have several institutional reasons to favour present generations over future 
ones and this is the basis for Assumption 2. This does not exclude future-focused voters, 
politicians and lobby groups, but so far they are not strong enough to fully neutralise the effects 
of short-termism. Therefore, it is important to find institutional changes that can create a 
counterbalance. 
 
 
 
37 MacKenzie, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 26–27. 
38 MacKenzie, 27. 
39 Berman and Boston, Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow 
Public Policy and Governance, xxvii. 
40 MacKenzie, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 28. 
41 MacKenzie, 29; Thompson, “Representing Future Generations: Political Presentism and Democratic 
Trusteeship,” 19–20. 
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2.2 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO SHORT-TERMISM 
Several policies have been proposed to deal with the sources of short-termism; they often affect 
different sources in different ways and it is even possible that they neutralise one source while 
worsening another, e.g. referenda might help counterbalance short-termism amongst politicians, 
while strengthening the position of (short-termist) voters. Table 1 - Policy Proposals to 
Neutralise short-termism gives a, non-exhaustive, overview of proposals, and it shows which 
sources of short-termism they are addressing and how effective they are. The latter (Low, 
Medium and High) is not a scientific metric, but serves an illustrative and informative purpose; 
no conclusions will be derived from it. 
Policy proposal Sources of short-termism Effectiveness 
Changing Voting System Voters Medium 
Constitutional Changes Voters/Politicians/Future Generations/ 
Special Interest Groups 
Medium 
Intergenerational Trust Funds Voters/Politicians/Future Generations Medium 
Second Chamber Politicians/Future Generations Low/Medium 
Public Discussions/Education Voters/Politicians Low/Medium 
Longer Electoral Terms Politicians Low/Medium 
Posterity Impact Statements Politicians/Future Generations Low/Medium 
Sub-Majority Rules Politicians/Future Generations High 
Referenda/Citizens’ Initiatives Politicians/Special Interest Groups Low/Medium 
Youth Quotas Politicians/Special Interest Groups Medium 
External Representation Voters/Politicians/Future Generations Medium/High 
Election Financing Laws Special Interest Groups Low/Medium 
Reserving Seats for Special 
Representatives 
Politicians/Future Generations Medium/High 
TABLE 1 - POLICY PROPOSALS TO NEUTRALISE SHORT-TERMISM42 
To address short-termism amongst voters, there are three types of proposals: changing the 
voting system, limiting the power of voters, and making voters think more about the future. 
Firstly, we can change the current voting system to give more influence to groups that are likely 
to favour future generations, e.g. lowering the voting age43, striking all voting age boundaries44 
or giving more votes to younger people45. Secondly, we can cement political decision-making to 
limit the influence of current generations, e.g. sealing rights of future generations within the 
 
42 The relation between column 1 (policy proposal) and column 2 (sources of short-termism) is 
comparable with Table 2.1 Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism in MacKenzie, “Institutional 
Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 31. 
43 Peto, “Why the Voting Age Should Be Lowered to 16.” 
44 Tremmel and Wilhelm, “Democracy or Epistocracy? Age as a Criterion of Voter Eligibility.” 
45 The proposal of ‘Demeny voting’ is that parents should get a vote for every child they have. In addition 
to their own vote, “we can think of women voting for all their underage female children and men for their 
underage male children”. Sanderson Warren C. and Scherbov Sergei, “A Near Electoral Majority of 
Pensioners: Prospects and Policies.” For more on this topic see Van Parijs, “The Disfranchisement of the 
Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure Intergenerational Justice”; Hinrichs, “Do the Old Exploit the Young? 
Is Enfranchising Children a Good Idea?” 
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constitution46 or creating Intergenerational Trust Funds47. Thirdly, we can make voters more 
future-focused, either by education48, public discussion or, more radically, bio-enhancement49. 
There are five proposals to limit short-termism amongst politicians: having fewer 
elections, making politicians discuss their decisions' impact on the future, evaluating their 
decisions, giving more power to political minorities and listening to citizens. Firstly, Longer 
Electoral Terms50 could make politicians care less about re-election. Secondly, with Posterity 
Impact Statements51 politicians have to “publicly justify any actions that might have long-term 
negative consequences.”52 Thirdly, we can create a randomly selected Second Chamber to 
evaluate government policy.53 Fourthly, the Sub-Majority Rule model ensures that “a minority of 
at least one-third of the legislators can require a referendum on a bill that can have a serious 
adverse impact on the living conditions of future people.” 54 Lastly, we can give more power to 
Citizens’ Initiatives and Referenda (but this might strengthen short-termism amongst voters). 
It is not feasible to fully stop the influence of special interest groups, but there are two 
solutions to mitigate it: providing a counterbalance and instituting financing laws. Firstly, we 
could empower future-focused groups to create a counterbalance, e.g. installing External 
Representatives, such as an Ombudsman for Future Generations55, or creating Youth Quotas56. 
Secondly, Election Financing Laws can also be an effective way to weaken the influence of special 
interest groups over politicians. The final source of short-termism, the absence of future 
generations, could be mitigated by Reserving Seats for Special Representatives of Future 
Generations.57 Altogether, there are many proposals and integrating multiple institutional 
responses will likely be most effective.58 
 
46 MacKenzie distinguishes between general, environmental, and balanced budget clauses, see Ekeli, 
“Green Constitutionalism: The Constitutional Protection of Future Generations”; Tremmel, “Establishing 
Intergenerational Justice in National Constitutions”; González-Ricoy, “Constitutionalizing 
Intergenerational Provisions.” 
47 Brown Weiss, “In Fairness to Future Generations.” 
48 Bell, “Creating Green Citizens? Political Liberalism and Environmental Education.” 
49 I will not discuss this further in this thesis, but there are obviously complicated ethical questions 
surrounding this proposal. Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. 
50 Järvensivu, “Four Steps to a Growth-Free, Prosperous Finland.” 
51 Thompson, “Representing Future Generations: Political Presentism and Democratic Trusteeship,” 32. 
52 MacKenzie, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 34. 
53 Barnett and Carty, The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords. as quoted by MacKenzie, 
“Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism.” 
54 Ekeli, “Constitutional Experiments: Representing Future Generations Through Submajority Rules*,” 440. 
55 Beckman and Uggla, “An Ombudsman for Future Generations: Legitimate and Effective?” 
56 Tremmel et al., Youth Quotas and Other Efficient Forms of Youth Participation in Ageing Societies features 
several interesting articles discussing the importance of youth quotas, especially Bidadanure, “Better 
Procedures for Fairer Outcomes: Can Youth Quotas Increase Our Chances of Meeting the Demands of 
Intergenerational Justice?”; Wallimann-Helmer, “Can Youth Quotas Help Avoid Future Disasters?” 
57 Dobson, “Representative Democracy and the Environment”; Ekeli, “Giving a Voice to Posterity – 
Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People.” 
58 MacKenzie, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 37. 
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2.3 DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY CONCERNS 
This thesis is not solely interested in the effectiveness of different solutions; I also believe that 
their democratic legitimacy is very important. Firstly, democratic procedures are often regarded 
as the most just way of decision-making as they incorporate the preferences of all citizens; 
ignoring this issue would force citizens to obey laws that they have not been able to discuss.59 
Secondly, future generations also want to govern themselves democratically and it might thus be 
in the interest of intergenerational justice to protect our democratic system.60 Thirdly, ignoring 
the issue of democratic legitimacy would also leave any proposal vulnerable to political attacks; 
several proposals, when becoming too powerful, faced criticism for being undemocratic and 
illegitimate and were removed or seriously weakened as a result.61 
To analyse the democratic legitimacy of the proposals in §2.2, I will first give a list of 
potential legitimacy concerns. This is only to show which solutions might be illegitimate, based 
on a very basic understanding of democracy; Chapter 3 will further clarify my conception of 
democratic legitimacy and discuss whether we can overcome potential legitimacy concerns. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the policy proposals in relation with their potential concerns and 
the level of concern. Again, this latter one (Low, Medium and High) is a very simplified and 
debatable metric, and it only serves an informative and indicative purpose in this thesis. 
Policy proposal Potential legitimacy concern Level of concern 
Changing Voting System No longer one person, one vote Medium/High 
Constitutional Changes Limits freedom for future generations Medium 
Intergenerational Trust Funds Less money to spend on current issues Low/Medium 
Second Chamber  Low 
Public Discussions/Education  Low 
Longer Electoral Terms Less accountability Low/Medium 
Posterity Impact Statements  Low 
Sub-Majority Rules Undermines majority rule Medium/High 
Referenda/Citizens’ Initiatives  Low 
Youth Quotas Limiting choices of voters Medium 
External Representation Gives power to political outsiders High 
Election Financing Laws Limits companies in their free speech Low/Medium 
Reserving Seats for Special 
Representatives 
Gives power to political outsiders High 
TABLE 2 – LEGITIMACY CONCERNS FOR DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES 
 
59 One could argue that our moral obligations should in fact trump democratic values, but I will hold that 
this should only occur when very unjust decisions are made (more on this in §0). 
60 Beckman argues that it is important that “institutional reforms (…) are legitimate not just in terms of 
environmental values but in terms of democratic values as well”, see Beckman, “Do Global Climate Change 
and the Interest of Future Generations Have Implications for Democracy?,” 622. 
61 Politicians argue that they are democratically elected and their vote should thus trump that of 
undemocratic institutions for future generations. The Hungarian ‘Ombudsman’ Sándor Fülöp described 
how he faced an “unfavourable political climate” and “there was an attempt to totally eradicate the Office” 
after he had become too influential. Lotherington, “Interview with New Trustee Dr. Sándor Fülöp.” 
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Democracy is often understood as “groups of people making collective decisions in a democratic 
way”62 and we can thus distinguish between two essential aspects: who decides and how we 
decide. The first legitimacy concern arises when giving political power to people outside the 
common group of people; I will call them political outsiders. It could be undemocratic to let these 
outsiders influence the outcome, as this will weaken the political power of the original 
electorate. The proposals to represent future generations, such as Reserving Seats for Special 
Representatives, creating an Ombudsman or other external representatives, or creating a Second 
Chamber, could face this objection. If the representative has only advisory and non-binding 
powers, this would be no problem as this would not give away any political power, but if this 
representative is granted stronger political tools this problem occurs. Additionally, these 
representatives face democratic concerns regarding the issues of authorisation and 
accountability, as they cannot be elected by future generations and can neither be held 
accountable by them (more on this in §3.6). 
The second major legitimacy concern regards the second aspect of democracy, how we 
decide, as some proposals require the reshaping of important democratic mechanisms. The 
concept of one person, one vote, based on the idea of democratic equality, could be harmed by 
Changing the Voting System. Only lowering the minimum voting age would probably not 
undermine this concept63, but giving more voting power to young people or parents could. 
Reserving Seats for Special Representatives could also undermine this concept, depending on 
how these representatives are elected.64 Another important democratic mechanism, the concept 
of majority rule, could be harmed by the proposal of Sub-Majority Rule. 
Besides these two major areas of concern, there are some other potential concerns 
amongst the remaining proposals. Constitutional Changes would be supported by current 
politicians, but might limit the political freedom of both current and future generations65. Youth 
Quotas could be seen as interfering with the freedom of political parties to pick their own 
candidates and the freedom of voters to select which politician they want. Intergenerational 
Trust Funds could render people's resources to tackle their short-term problems meagre or 
insufficient. Longer Electoral Terms could weaken the accountability of politicians as voters 
correct them less frequently. Election Financing Laws would limit donations, which could be 
seen as a form of free speech. Lastly, proposals that only facilitate discussions, make politicians 
 
62 Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 40. 
63 A minimum voting age can be anti-democratic as it excludes citizens, i.e. children, from exercising their 
right to vote. Tremmel and Wilhelm, “Democracy or Epistocracy? Age as a Criterion of Voter Eligibility.” 
64 Dobson’s proposal to give the environmental lobby two votes would face this objection, while Ekeli’s 
idea of giving everyone two votes would not. Dobson, “Representative Democracy and the Environment”; 
Ekeli, “Giving a Voice to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People.” 
65 More on the importance of sustaining political liberties for future generations in Chapter 3 or Beckman, 
“Do Global Climate Change and the Interest of Future Generations Have Implications for Democracy?” 
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justify their actions, or allow for Citizens’ Initiatives or Referenda, seem not to raise any 
legitimacy problems. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has identified four different sources of short-termism in our democratic system and 
has given an overview of proposals that have been made to neutralise this phenomenon. Where 
many articles on this topic mainly focus on the effectiveness of these proposals (see Table 1), 
this thesis compares the effectiveness with the democratic legitimacy of such proposals (see 
Table 2). In the Introduction, I hypothesised that: The more effective a future-focused institution 
aims to be, the more democratically illegitimate it will be (see the Inverse Relation Problem). This 
appears to be in line with what we see if we compare Table 1 and Table 2: the most effective 
proposals also lead to more and stronger legitimacy concerns. Therefore, if we decide to only act 
upon legitimate policy proposals, like Public Discussions or Posterity Impact Statements, this 
will not be effective enough to fulfil our moral obligations to future generations; yet, if we want 
to fulfil these moral obligations, it seems necessary to inflict upon democratic legitimacy. The 
question is what way to choose out of this dilemma.  
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CHAPTER 3: ON DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM 
Chapter 1 assumed that we have moral obligations towards future generations and Chapter 2 
assumed that our current democratic systems are short-termist and neglect these obligations. 
Future-focused institutions aim to neutralise this short-termism to make democracies satisfy 
these moral obligations; such institutions should be effective in satisfying these moral 
obligations, but they should also be democratically legitimate (see §2.3). Yet, the previous 
chapter suggested that these two criteria are mutually exclusive and inversely related; I will call 
this the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma (see below), as introduced in the Introduction. There 
appear to be two ways to solve this dilemma: either we prioritise our moral obligations and 
reshape our democracy, or we prioritise our democratic obligations and limit ourselves to non-
binding, and less effective, policy proposals. 
 
Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma 
Premiss 1: Future-focused institutions should be democratically legitimate 
Premiss 2: They should be effective in fulfilling our obligations to future generations 
Premiss 3: The more effective a future-focused institution aims to be, the more 
democratically illegitimate it will be (Conclusion of the Inverse Relation Problem)  
Conclusion: We need to prioritise either democratic legitimacy or effectiveness 
 
This thesis suggests a third solution; I believe the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma to be 
a false dilemma and I will oppose Premiss 3 by arguing that there is at least one way to satisfy 
our obligations to future generations that is both effective and democratically legitimate. §0 will 
first clarify my conception of democratic legitimacy. §3.2 will then look at the more effective 
proposals from Chapter 2: On Short-Termism and how to deal with it and explain why I will 
focus on proposals that aim to represent future generations. §3.3 discusses the concern 
(expressed in §2.3) that such representation would give power to political outsiders. §3.4 and 
§3.5 argue that the two most prominent democratic theories defining the boundaries of a demos 
both require us to include the representation of future generations. Lastly, §3.6 discusses the 
authorisation and accountability of representatives. 
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3.1 CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
Premiss 1 requires that a future-focused institution is democratically legitimate, but this is a 
complex notion and thus it is important to clarify how this thesis will understand democratic 
legitimacy. This thesis assumes that democratic governments in general are legitimate in 
exercising authority.66 It will also assume that it is independent of our conception of democratic 
decision-making whether we prefer deliberative, aggregative or epistemic models.67 Instead, this 
thesis requires a more specific concept of democratic legitimacy that discusses the relation 
between democratic procedures and morally just outcomes. Is a democratic procedure the only 
way to decide what outcome is legitimate or can we independently define just outcomes and 
change our democracy if it does not create these outcomes? 
There are two monistic conceptions of democratic legitimacy that argue that there is only 
one determining factor for democratic legitimacy; instrumentalists68 prioritise just outcomes, 
while proceduralists69 prioritise democratic procedures.70 I believe that it is problematic to hold 
such a monistic view; can we not determine whether an outcome is just without a democratic 
procedure and should we not oppose unjust outcomes, even when they arise from democratic 
procedures? Therefore this thesis will adopt an approach of “evaluative dualism”71 that 
combines both dimensions of democratic legitimacy even though they might sometimes conflict. 
The core of this argument is that in general democratic assemblies create legitimate decisions, 
but this authority ends when their decisions “publicly violate[s] justice”, e.g. when basic liberal 
rights are harmed, major parts of society are disenfranchised or discriminated against.72 This 
clarification will not take away all discussion, but I trust this normative conception of legitimacy 
to be reasonably acceptable.  
 
 
66 This is a different debate that does not fall in the scope of this thesis. Theories that argue where this 
legitimation comes from are based on concepts of consent, reasonable consensus, associative obligation or 
instrumentalism; legitimate political authority is then based on concepts of justified coercion, the capacity 
to impose duties or the right to rule. For more on this, see Christiano, “Authority.” 
67 To shortly clarify the distinction, in the deliberative model “individual preferences may change”, while 
the aggregative model expects preferences to be fixed. Peter prefers an epistemic model, in which 
“democratic processes are valued as knowledge producing processes”. For more on this, see Peter, 
“Democratic Legitimacy and Proceduralist Social Epistemology.” 
68 Instrumentalism prioritises the outcomes of democratic decision-making; if they are just, then a policy 
is legitimate. See Arneson, “Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy.” 
69 Proceduralism prioritises the democratic process of reaching a decision; “political legitimacy 
is achieved through democratic authorization”. See Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” 719. 
70 For more on the argument that these are monistic views, see Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy.” 
71 “It is dualistic because it regards democratic institutions as evaluable from two distinct and irreducible 
points of view that may sometimes conflict.” Christiano, 268. 
72 Christiano describes the limits of authority as follows: “when a democratic assembly votes to enslave or 
suspend the core of liberal rights or radically discriminate against a part of the sane adult population, it 
does not publicly realize justice and so does not have legitimate authority.” Christiano, 285–90. 
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Assumption 3: Democratic governments are legitimate in exercising authority and their decisions 
are legitimate when made democratically, unless these decisions publicly violate justice.73 
 
3.2 CHOOSING FOR REPRESENTATION 
Having clarified my conception of democratic legitimacy, I will now aim to show that there can 
be at least one effective proposal that is democratically legitimate. The second premiss of the 
Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma presumes the effectiveness of future-focused institutions, 
therefore I will disregard less effective proposals, such as Posterity Impact Statements or Public 
Discussions. This does not imply that such proposals cannot be useful; on the contrary, these 
proposals can be beneficial, especially since they do not face any legitimacy concerns, but they 
are not strong enough to fulfil our moral obligations to future generations. Therefore, this thesis 
will propose to implement of one of the more radical proposals. 
Chapter 2 discussed seven possible solutions that have a least a medium-level of 
effectiveness; this thesis only requires one such proposal to be democratically legitimate to 
disprove the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma. I have chosen in this thesis to focus on the 
concept of instituting representatives for future generations, either by means of External 
Representation or by Reserving Seats for Special Representatives in parliament. These 
institutions could not only neutralise the absence of future generations, but also inform 
politicians to think of better solutions. However, not all such representatives will be effective; 
they will need a strong mandate with either a veto power to prevent laws that have a strong 
negative impact on future generations, or a strong position in parliament.74 I will assume for 
now that representatives of future generations can be effective (I will come back to that in 
Chapter 4). 
This thesis does not argue that representation is the only suitable option or legitimate 
solution, but there are political reasons for not choosing the other proposals. Firstly, by 
Changing the Voting System or imposing Youth Quotas we give more influence to future-friendly 
individuals. However, it will be very difficult to find an objective criterion to decide who is 
 
73 This is a simplified account of Christiano’s concept, especially on the notion of democratic decision-
making, which he further specifies as the capacity to “publicly realize justice in itself” based on 
“reasonable disagreement on the justice of legislation”. For an in-depth discussion, see Christiano, 285. 
74 MacKenzie points out that “unless it is empowered to veto legislative proposals – which would raise 
questions about its democratic legitimacy – an Ombudsman would not be in a position to directly 
challenge the power of elected officials or special interest groups with dominant short-term objectives.” 
MacKenzie, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 35. 
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future-friendly; proxies, like young people, are not necessarily future-friendly75, and even if they 
are, it is still only one aspect on which basis they decide what to vote for. Secondly, I believe that 
Sub-Majority Rule is problematic as it is likely to be "strategically abused" by opposition groups 
to delay bills that they do not want to get passed.76 Thirdly, Constitutional Clauses can be very 
effective, but they are very difficult to put in place; they are not always easily enforceable and, 
also, this solution does not work in every country77. Lastly, Intergenerational Trust Funds save 
money from being squandered, but our obligations to future generations can also require us to 
spend money now, e.g. on sustainable developments. 
 
Assumption 4: The representation of future generations can be effective 
 
3.3 ABSENCE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS AND THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM 
As I have chosen to focus on the representation of future generations, I will now have to argue 
why the legitimacy concern of ‘giving political power to political outsiders’ (see 2.3) is 
unfounded in a more thorough understanding of democratic theory. This leads to the important 
yet complex question of “how to decide who legitimately make up ‘‘the people’’ and hence are 
entitled to govern themselves”.78 This is a problem which has become known as the ‘boundary 
problem’, what are the boundaries of ‘the demos’. This section will establish the most prominent 
theories to answer the boundary problem, before we can apply them to future generations. 
Democratic theorists have had difficulty formulating an answer to this problem, as it 
seems impossible to answer it with democratic theory. Before we can make democratic 
decisions, we need to have a group that forms this democracy, thus “the decision of how the 
initial demos is to be constituted cannot be made in a democratic way.”79 Therefore, the principle 
on which we decide how to form the demos should be made “on the basis of some principles 
 
75 There is little academic proof. “People of different generations appear to have similar policy preferences 
on a range of issues that affect age groups differently, including medical care, education spending, and 
public pensions”. MacKenzie, 29. Also see: Freund and Blanchard-Fields, “Age-Related Differences in 
Altruism across Adulthood: Making Personal Financial Gain versus Contributing to the Public Good.” 
76 Ekeli’s defence is twofold: political minorities need to prove that a bill harms future generations and 
they who abuse this tool might get electorally punished. Yet, it is always open to debate what the future 
effects are and the opposition is more likely to be rewarded for stopping laws they disagree with. Ekeli, 
“Constitutional Experiments: Representing Future Generations Through Submajority Rules*,” 456. 
77 Some countries do not have constitutional courts to enforce the constitution. 
78 Dahl continues that this “is a problem almost totally neglected by all the great political philosophers 
who wrote about democracy.” Dahl, After the Revolution; Authority in a Good Society,. as quoted by Goodin, 
“Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 41; Song, “The Boundary Problem in 
Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,” 39. 
79 Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 43. 
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other than those [democratic ones].”80 This could mean “that we do not (indeed, cannot) offend 
against democratic principles by organizing the demos in any manner that we choose”81, yet 
many would feel that certain compositions of the demos would at least feel very undemocratic.82 
Even though it cannot democratically be decided who should be included, it is possible to 
use democratic principles to answer this problem. Firstly, the All Affected Interests Principle83 
argues that everyone should be included who is affected by a certain decision; this is based on 
the democratic idea that people should have the right to vote as their lives are influenced by 
their governments. There are two problems with this theory. Firstly, it is often overinclusive and 
would imply that the whole world should have some degree of participation or influence on 
certain decisions. Secondly, when every policy requires a different ‘demos’, the decision-making 
process would be very unpractical and unstable and this could undermine the value of political 
equality.84 A less demanding version of this theory could be that we either aim to not affect 
people outside the demos or compensate them when they are affected.85 
Secondly, an alternative is to constitute a demos on the basis of democratic values – I will 
call this the Democratic Values Theory. This theory supports current territorial borders, as they 
are effective in ensuring political equality.86 To achieve political equality, a democracy needs to 
protect “equal rights and liberties”, provide “equal opportunities for political influence”, and there 
should be solidarity between citizens.87 A smaller and more cohesive society, as is the status quo, 
ensures that citizens’ rights are better protected, that citizens will trust each other relatively 
more, and that citizens will have better contacts with their representatives. Therefore the 
Democratic Values Theory argues that we should bind people by citizenship, as this makes them 
best equipped to have a functioning democratic state. Critics of such theories, argue that the 
 
80 Goodin, 47. 
81 Goodin, 44. On page 46 he refers to Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1950) 
who supports such a view claiming that we must “leave every populus to define [it]self”. 
82 Goodin points to an example by Dahl where “the members of the Politburo would constitute the Soviet 
Populous” Goodin, 47. 
83 I use the term used in Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives.”, although he 
later specifies it to ‘All Possibly Affected Interests’. Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: 
Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State.”, distinguishes between this and a more strict principle, 
the coercion principle, in which all people should vote that could be coerced by the state. I believe this 
principle is not fundamentally different from the all affected interests principle – maybe a bit less 
overinclusive – and Goodin also points out that it “is invariably open to the same sorts of counterexamples 
that plague the others” (Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 49.). 
84 Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State.” 
85 “If people whose interests we affect are kept outside our demos, we are obliged – by principles of 
democracy, as well as ones of justice and humanity – to settle up.” Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected 
Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 68. 
86 “The fundamental moral presumption of democracy is that no person is intrinsically superior to 
another” Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the 
State,” 43. 
87 Song, 44. 
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importance of territorial borders is merely “an approximation to constituting it on the basis of 
what really matters, which is interlinked interests”.88 
Either of these theories could deal successfully with the boundary problem and I do not 
intend to argue why one of them works better than the other. Instead, I am interested to see how 
they deal with a further complication: the temporal boundary problem.89 Global problems, such 
as ecological degradation, harm ‘political outsiders’ not only spatially (neighbouring regions that 
are affected by pollution), but also temporally (future citizens who are deprived of 
environmental resources). Both groups, foreign nationals and future generations, can be seen as 
non-citizens and are thus currently excluded from the democratic process. But how would these 
two theories deal with this temporal boundary problem and the status of future generations?  
If we regard the All Affected Interests Principle, it is clearly impossible to avoid affecting 
future generations, but we could still opt for the option of compensation.90 But is it possible to 
compensate future generations and in what way should we then compensate them? The 
Democratic Values Theory focuses on the basic liberties and rights of current individuals, but can 
our decisions not also harm the liberties of future generations? When the concept of citizenship 
should define the boundary of a state, should ‘future citizens’ not be included as well? As neither 
of these theories discusses the inclusion of future generations, I will try to analyse them in order 
to show that it is our democratic duty to include future generations in our democratic system.  
 
3.4 FUTURE GENERATIONS AND THE ALL AFFECTED INTERESTS PRINCIPLE 
Future generations pose a further complication to the All Affected Interests Principle, namely that 
“everyone in all possible future worlds should be entitled to vote on any proposal”.91 Therefore, 
it is surprising that influential writers on the boundary problem remain so silent on this topic.92 
 
88 Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 49. 
89 “The spatial boundary problem arises because the decisions taken within one democratic nation-state 
can affect the basic interests of non-citizens living outside it. The temporal boundary problem arises 
because the decisions taken by current democratic citizens can affect the basic interests of people who are 
not currently full citizens but will be in the future.” Zakaras, “Democracy, Children, and the Environment: 
A Case for Commons Trusts.” 
90 Goodin argues for compensation: “that we would have to pay them off for any harms we inflict upon 
them and accede to their demands for fair recompense for any benefits we derive from the wrongfully 
disenfranchised.” Zakaras mimics this approach. “If it is not feasible to enfranchise everyone who stands 
to be affected, then democracy requires that other means be found to approximate electoral accountability 
across (temporal or spatial) boundaries.” Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its 
Alternatives,” 68; Zakaras, “Democracy, Children, and the Environment: A Case for Commons Trusts,” 146. 
91 Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 55. 
92 For example, Goodin only refers to it without really addressing it, Song does not mention it at all and 
neither does Arrhenius, another influential article on the boundary problem. Goodin, “Enfranchising All 
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Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007) is one of the few to discuss this more in depth, but he argues that the 
All Affected Interests Principle should not include the interests of future generations. His 
argument proceeds as follows: 
 
“(1) Everyone who is affected by a decision should take part in it (the all affected 
principle) 
(2) By our ordinary political decisions we affect future people 
(3) There is no way that we may include future people in our decision-making 
processes 
(4) Hence, the all affected principle must be wrong (or at least utopian)”93 
 
Tännsjö defends the all affected principle by attacking the second premiss: we do not actually 
affect future people, as they do not exist yet, i.e. the Non-Identity Problem. In Chapter 1 I assumed 
that there is a solution to this problem (assumption 1a) and that we thus have obligations to 
future people (assumption 1).94 But does that mean that if we agree with the second premiss, i.e. 
that we affect future people, that we must reject the All Affected Interests Principle? I will argue 
that we should reject the third premiss instead: we can include future people in our decision-
making process. Therefore, if we agree with the All Affected Interests Principle and we assume 
that we can affect future people, then we are obliged to include them in our decision-making. 
So what is the reason that Tännsjö includes and accepts the third premiss? He argues 
that “on a narrow and standard interpretation of political ‘representation’, this is a non-starter” 
(…) “since in no way can the representatives of the future generations be held responsible by 
their constituency.” I will assume for now that we can politically represent future generations 
and I will elaborate on this in §3.6. Yet, if we can uphold the All Affected Interests Principle by 
representing future generations; the question remains how we should do that. Therefore, I will 
first discuss what will be the practical consequences of incorporating future generations. 
 
Assumption 5: We can politically represent future generations 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives”; Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the 
Demos Should Be Bounded by the State”; Arrhenius, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory.” 
93 Tännsjö, “Future People, the All Affected Principle, and the Limits of the Aggregation: Model of 
Democracy,” 5. 
94 Even Tännsjö admits that the “fact that, in a straightforward sense of the word, we do not "affect" future 
people, does not mean that, in our actual democratic decision-making, we should not care about the 
future.” Tännsjö, 12. 
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A full realisation of the All Affected Interests Principle leads to “wildly impractical” outcomes and 
therefore practical implementations of this principle are often defined as “what arrangements 
might best approximate that ideal in some practice that is feasible.”95 Most common solutions, 
however, would not work in the case of future generations; it is not really an option to simply 
‘stop affecting’ future generations, to form a bigger (world) government that would include them 
or to pay them compensations, as they are not hear to make themselves heard or receive 
compensations96. Therefore, if all these approximations do not work, I believe we are obliged to 
grant them representation in order to make sure that their interests are considered. 
How would this work? Does every future individual get a vote?97 Tännsjö argues that this 
would lead to ‘strange results’, as different future worlds require different representatives (the 
Non-Identity Problem) and that a group of future people that will lead lives barely worth living 
could outvote a smaller group of happy future people (the Repugnant Conclusion).98 However, 
alternative notions of intergenerational justice would not require representatives to represent 
every single future individual, e.g. the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle (see §1.1) could 
require representatives to work in the interest of a future world that would have both high 
collective and individual levels of well-being. This would imply that representatives do not get 
one vote for every future individual they represent, but rather that they can interfere when the 
well-being of future generations is at stake, e.g. by having the power to veto laws that have a 
strong negative effect on future generations. If we support the All Affected Interests Principle, I 
believe this is the only way in which we can ‘settle up’ to future generations. 
 
3.5 FUTURE GENERATIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES THEORY 
However, if we support the Democratic Values Theory, that current territorial boundaries are the 
best way to uphold the democratic values of equality and solidarity, the previous analysis would 
 
95 Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 64. 
96 We could compensate future generations via intergenerational trust funds. Brown Weiss explains this as 
that “each generation pay for maintaining the planet and compensate future generations for the costs that 
it imposes on them by its use of the natural resources of the planet.” But I would question whether 
financial compensation could ever repay the destruction of environmental capital. Besides, it is very 
complicated to measure how much generations should pay and, as Brown Weiss points out, the “discount 
rate that economists use to consider future costs and benefits is likely in practice to favor the present 
generation over future ones.” That is why I will discard this alternative solution for now. Brown Weiss, “In 
Fairness to Future Generations,” 30. 
97 To make it even more complicated, we could even discuss whether we should also adapt our system to 
represent past people (see Bergström, “Democracy and Future Generations.”) or even the environment 
(e.g. Goodin, “Enfranchising the Earth, and Its Alternatives.”) as mentioned by Goodin, “Enfranchising All 
Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” 55, but that falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
98 Tännsjö, “Future People, the All Affected Principle, and the Limits of the Aggregation: Model of 
Democracy,” 10. 
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obviously not suffice.99 The basis of this theory is that current states are best suited to protect 
basic rights and liberties of citizens, such as “the right to vote and freedom of association, 
religious liberty and freedom of nonpolitical speech”.100 As this theory is unclear about the status 
of future generations, I have to establish whether they can also claim to have these basic rights. 
It might be argued that basic rights are contingent on existence and that future generations 
therefore do not have these rights, but I believe that it is reasonable to assume that this theory 
would at least require us to ensure that future generations have these basic rights and liberties 
when they exist. But what does it entail to protect the democratic rights of future generations? 
In a narrow understanding of these basic rights and liberties, we could limit this to “the 
obligations we may have in securing political freedom for the unborn”.101 However, I believe 
basic liberties to be broader than just the ability to vote: they are the freedom for a people to 
decide their own future. The colossal threats posed by climate change are threatening this 
future102 and many decisions are irreversible.103 But even if environmental degradation places a 
heavy burden of the future of our planet, does this mean it threatens the basic rights of future 
individuals? It would be clear if it would cause the extinction of humankind, but is seriously 
harming the planet enough to threaten basic rights? I believe that a fictional country, which has a 
well-functioning democracy, but almost no economy, no resources and a depleted environment, 
cannot protect basic rights. Citizens would have the right to vote and could speak out freely, but 
nothing would happen in their interest as the government would have no means to ensure any of 
these interests. Surely, if we apply democratic values, we are obliged to avoid this situation? 
One could object that this reading of the Democratic Values Theory is too broad and that 
this theory should not apply to the basic rights of future people as it focuses on rights within a 
democratic state and does not include ‘political outsiders’. Yet, Sarah Song, who supports the 
Democratic Values Theory, acknowledges that a narrow understanding of this theory “falls short 
of giving voice to those outsiders”.104 Therefore she suggests that we should “give some 
representation to outsiders affected or coerced by a state’s policies but without extending equal 
rights of participation called for by the affected interests or coercion principles”105, e.g. theories 
 
99 Although Song does not necessarily reject the All Affected Interests Principle, but rather some of its 
implications. She argues that the principle could be supplementary to her theory. Song, “The Boundary 
Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,” 62–63. 
100 Song, 45. 
101 Beckman, “Do Global Climate Change and the Interest of Future Generations Have Implications for 
Democracy?,” 610. 
102 Even Beckman, who argued that we should not think too lightly about adapting democratic institutions, 
concludes that “[r]adical measures addressing global climate change are needed”, Beckman, 622. 
103 “Critical resources may have been depleted, and environmental treasures spoiled” Thompson, 
“Representing Future Generations: Political Presentism and Democratic Trusteeship,” 18. 
104 Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,” 
63. 
105 Song, 64. 
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of ‘reciprocal representation’106 or ‘external representation’107. The first proposal does not work 
for future generations as there cannot be reciprocity, but the idea of external representation 
could work and Song argues that this is coherent with the Democratic Values Theory. 
This could then also help us define how these future generations could be included in the 
Democratic Values Theory. Political equality requires that basic rights and liberties are ensured 
“by providing equal opportunities for political influence”.108 The presence of future generations 
is not a theoretical necessity for political influence; they can still influence political decision-
making via a representative. The idea of external representation is that when our decisions are 
coercive to outsiders, these outsiders should be included in the decision-making without 
including them in the demos.109 Future generations fulfil these criteria, as their representation 
does not alter the character of the demos or affect impersonal trust, and representation could be 
successful in dealing with the external effects by creating a system “that can apply sanctions to a 
democratic body whose decisions have an unjustified negative impact on outsiders”.110 It is thus 
coherent with the Democratic Values Theory to create a strong position for this representative. 
 
3.6 REPRESENTING FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Hitherto, §3.4 and §3.5 argued that if we analyse the All Affected Interests Principle and the 
Democratic Values Theory, we find that they both require us to represent future generations and 
to give these representatives the power to block decision that have a serious negative impact. 
However, both arguments are based on the assumption that we can politically represent future 
generation (Assumption 5). But how can we represent them and who should be their 
representative? To answer this question, I will first look at the role representation plays within 
politics. Then, I will sketch some complications that arise when representing future generations. 
Finally, I will describe some ways in which we can overcome these problems. 
 
106 The theory of reciprocal representation holds that “two states accord each other a number of seats in 
their respective national legislatures with the right to speak and possibly also the right to vote on certain 
issues.” Schmitter, “Exploring the Problematic Triumph of Liberal Democracy and Concluding with a 
Modest Proposal for Improving Its International Impact.” as quoted by Song, “The Boundary Problem in 
Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,” 64. 
107 The theory of external representation holds that “the representatives of state X are given a voice but 
not a vote in the legislature of state Y whose decisions coerce or affect the citizens of state X.” Miller, 
“Democracy’s Domain.” as quoted by Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the 
Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,” 64. 
108 Song, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,” 
44. 
109 Miller balances the “need to have a demos that functions well internally” and “the need to include 
within the demos those whose lives will be systematically impacted by its decisions” Miller, “Democracy’s 
Domain,” 226. 
110 Miller, 227. 
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Representation is an important yet complex concept within democratic theory and there 
appears to be no consensus on what the ideal role of representatives should be. Historically, 
philosophers distinguished between representatives as delegates who simply follow the 
expressed preferences of their electorate and representatives as trustees who get the trust and 
support of the electorate to make their own judgments.111 A formalistic view of representation112 
focuses on authorisation and accountability, but future generations lack both options. Therefore, 
it is necessary to adopt a different concept of representation. 
I will instead adopt the more contemporary concept of representation as advocacy, 
which combines the “link to the electors' cause and the representative's relative autonomy of 
judgment”.113 This would imply in this situation that representatives should have a clear focus 
on the interests of future generations and that representatives do not require explicit consent 
from future generations to act in their interest. 114 Thereby, authorisation and accountability are 
no longer required. Representatives for future generations can advocate the interests of a group 
that have not elected them, like some politicians already work for children’s rights or a 
sustainable future. And although future generations cannot hold these representatives 
accountable, contemporary politicians, lobby groups, or voters, could take up this task. 
However, the representation of future generations faces three further challenges. Firstly, 
there is an epistemic problem: we lack specific knowledge about future generations, which 
makes it difficult to decide with policies to propose and also to check whether a representative is 
doing the right thing. Therefore, it is beneficial to include expert opinions as well as to make 
citizens more knowledgeable about the consequences of our actions.115 But even if we do not 
know their precise preferences, we could still adopt the principle that representatives should 
treat future generations with equal respect as we have for current generations.116 Such a 
principle provides at least some guidance in evaluating the impacts of political decisions. 
 
111 The delegate-view was famously argued for in Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers : Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, while the trustee-view is often referred to Burke, Reflections on the 
Revolution in France. For more on this distinction, see Pitkin, The Concept of Representation. 
112 Hanna Pitkin distinguishes between four views of representation based on institutional arrangements 
(formal), the symbolic power (symbolic), the resemblance between representatives and their constituents 
(descriptive) and whether representatives serve the best interest of their constituents (substantive). 
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation as quoted and analysed by Dovi, “Political Representation.” 
113 Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,” 773. 
114 González-Ricoy and Gosseries also opt for this option in regard to future people: “[t]he relationship 
between non-overlapping generations may thus be better understood in terms of ‘guardianship’ or 
‘advocacy’ rather than of ‘representation’, at least in its strict, formalistic sense.” González-Ricoy and 
Gosseries, “Designing Institutions for Future Generations: An Introduction,” 19. 
115 If we “stimulate deliberation among the wider public”, the support might also increase. Karnein, “Can 
We Represent Future Generations?,” 94–95. 
116 Anja Karnein argues that we should adopt the principle that future generations should be treated with 
equal respect to how we treat ourselves: “that we would have to justify our decisions to future generations 
as if they were present today.” Karnein, 93. This resembles Beckman’s contractualist approach that we 
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Secondly, future generations are likely to have diverse interests, just like present 
generations, so how can one representative rightfully represent this plurality of preferences? To 
deal with this problems, I support the idea of a broad deliberation process with multiple 
representatives of future generations, “in order to include various possible viewpoints.”117 
Thirdly, there is the danger that a representative for future generations is insincere and uses his 
position to advance a political or self-interested motive. I believe that a precise, externally 
defined mandate118, can help to ensure that representatives cannot corrupt the business and that 
we can hold them accountable when they would act insincerely. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter pursued to solve the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma by showing that a future-
focused institution can be both democratically legitimate and effective in fulfilling its moral 
obligations. This chapter selected the proposal of representing future generations and argued 
why it fits in my conception of democratic legitimacy. I showed that the two most influential 
theories to discuss who should be included in democratic decision-making, the All Affected 
Interests Principle and the Democratic Values Theory, both require the inclusion of future 
generations in our democracies by means of representation. §3.6 argued why we can represent 
future generations if we view representation as advocacy. As Chapter 4 will discuss how we 
ensure that this solution is effective, this chapter provided us with several desiderata119 that help 
to guide how we should institute this proposal: 
I. Political power: to veto laws that have a significant negative impact on future generations 
II. Future-focused: to ensure its link with the interests of future generations 
III. Autonomy: to make free judgments about the interests of future generations 
IV. Principle of ‘equal respect’: to provide guidance in deciding what should be done 
V. Broad decision-making process: to include several opinions 
VI. Precise, externally-defined mandate: to prevent insincerity   
                                                                                                                                                                                              
should justify our decisions about future generations in a way that if we would hypothetically explain 
ourselves, they “could not reasonably reject.” Beckman, “Do Global Climate Change and the Interest of 
Future Generations Have Implications for Democracy?,” 619. 
117 Karnein, “Can We Represent Future Generations?,” 94. 
118 See González-Ricoy and Gosseries, “Designing Institutions for Future Generations: An Introduction,” 
sec. 4. for a further explanation of the ‘four dimensions of a mandate’: procedural or substantive, broad or 
narrow, vague or precise, and externally defined or self-defined. 
119 Something that is considered desirable in making future-focused institutions more effective, but it is 
not a theoretical necessity. 
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CHAPTER 4: ON STRONG EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION AND FEASIBILITY 
Chapter 3 argued that it is democratically legitimate to institute representatives for future 
generations that have the political power to veto laws that have a significant negative impact on 
future generations, but how should we structure these institutions to ensure their effectiveness. 
This chapter aims to apply the desiderata from §3.7 to identify how an effective representative 
needs to be structured. Therefore, §4.1 will analyse theoretical proposals and will conclude that 
strong external representation is most suitable. §4.2 will study examples from Israel, Hungary 
and Wales, where they have introduced similar representatives, to discuss their successes and 
downfalls. Finally, §4.3 will show that it is feasible to institute such representatives. 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL PROPOSALS 
There have been many proposals on how to represent future generations and in order to 
compare them, I will first categorise them in two categories of proposals: external and internal 
representation. External representation proposes an institution outside of the political sphere 
but with political influence, such as an Ombudsman or a Commissioner. They differ in respect to 
desideratum I.; some have just an informative role (weak) others can veto laws (strong). Internal 
representation aims to represent future generations in our legislative assemblies, either by 
electing special representatives for the future or by creating political committees, in which 
current politicians take place, that discuss the effects laws have on the future (see Figure 1). 
I believe that the best way to institute effective representatives and to follow the 
different desiderata, is by strong external representation. This form of representation deals with 
almost all sources of short-termism and combines an autonomous future-focused approach 
(desiderata II. and III.) with the power to veto harmful legislation (desideratum I.);120 yet, 
surprisingly, this approach is very uncommon in the literature. There are some proposals that 
give more powers to representatives; Edith Brown Weiss (1990) argues that representatives 
should “intervene in administrative and judicial proceedings”;121 and a proposal by the 
International NGO World Future Council defines the responsibilities of representatives not just 
as Ombudsman for citizens, but also as an advisory and auditing body for governments and 
parliaments.122 There seem to be no academic proposals for an institution that can veto laws. 
 
120 Strong external representation is primarily focused on “preventing future harm”, in contrast to 
institutions that “promote future benefits, or address both types of challenges”; it is “a primarily 
protective institution”. MacKenzie, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism,” 38. 
121 Brown Weiss, “In Fairness to Future Generations,” 11. 
122 Göpel and Pearce, “Guarding Our Future,” 3. 
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FIGURE 1 - CATEGORISING FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 
The alternative of weak external representation lacks desideratum I. and although it might still 
have some effect, it does little to tackle the different sources of short-termism. There are two 
reasons why some prefer this type of proposal: legitimacy and feasibility. Firstly, some are afraid 
that a strong alternative is illegitimate and given the “uncertain democratic status of institutions 
promoting the interests of future generations” it is safer to propose an ombudsman, which “does 
not possess formal power”.123 Secondly, some fear that it is politically infeasible to institute 
strong external representation as this would limit the power of current politicians. §3.4 and §3.5 
argue that if we analyse democratic theory, it is necessary that future generations have the 
possibility to stop significant future harm; §4.3 will argue why a strong option is not infeasible. 
A third category is internal representation in which current politicians have to discuss the 
impact their decisions will have on the future. Although politicians have some political power 
(desideratum I.), they are not necessarily future-focused and face all the existing mechanisms 
that cause short-termism amongst politicians, like re-election and the need for quick wins. The 
Finnish Committee for the Future, in which 17 members of the Finnish Parliament take place, is 
such an institution.124 Simon Caney argues for a similar Parliamentary Committee for the Future, 
which has a broader responsibility, in that it should evaluate all policies and should be 
empowered to hold government ministers accountable if they harm future generations.125 
 
123 Beckman and Uggla, “An Ombudsman for Future Generations: Legitimate and Effective?,” 124. 
124 Its “mission is to generate dialogue with the government on major future problems and opportunities” 
“Committee for the Future.” 
125 Caney, “Political Institutions for the Future: A Five-Fold Package.” 
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Reserving seats in legislative assemblies for politicians that only represent future 
interests is more promising as it is more future-focused (desideratum II.) and has more political 
power (desideratum I.), as a ‘qualified majority’126 could delay laws that would inflict serious 
harm on future generations. This proposal has never been experimented with and the 
theoretical proposals differ in whether the politicians should be elected by “the environmental 
sustainability lobby”127 or that every individual should get two votes, one for the normal 
politicians and one for the representatives for future generations.128 However, it faces many 
practical objections. Even if we can avoid that misuse these positions “for strategic and egoistic 
reasons”129, how do we check these representatives and how do we avoid that their ‘electability’ 
influences them.130 Thus, I hold strong external representation to be the most effective solution. 
 
4.2 CASE STUDIES 
In §4.1 we established that the concept of strong external representation is the most effective 
type of representation. To further analyse this concept, I will look at institutions that have tried 
to represent future generations. “Canada, Finland, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, and Wales 
either have or have had an office that serves to protect the needs of future generations”131; yet, 
only three examples resemble strong external representation: Israel, Hungary and Wales.132 I will 
shortly discuss these three case studies and show what we can learn from the challenges they 
faced? So far, there has been no case of a representative institution that could veto laws. 
The oldest of these institutions is the Israeli Commission for Future Generations (2001-
2006). The two most important tools that gave the Commissioner political power were that he 
could always demand information and that he could delay a bill for a ‘reasonable time’ to first 
‘prepare an opinionated position’.133 It had some success, but was already disbanded after its 
first term after right-wing politicians argued that the Commission “had not justified itself” and 
that it was too costly;134 there are three main reasons for this. Firstly, it lacked political support 
as it started as the ‘personal revelation’ of one influential politician, Yosef ‘Tommy’ Lapid, who 
 
126 This could be “for instance ⅔ or ¾” of all the representatives of future generations. Ekeli, “Giving a 
Voice to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People,” 434. 
127 Dobson, “Representative Democracy and the Environment,” 132–33. as quoted by Ekeli, “Giving a Voice 
to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People,” 435. 
128 Ekeli, “Giving a Voice to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People.” 
129 Ekeli wants to solve this by instituting legal norms that can restrict the establishment of such parties 
and by ensuring that ordinary political parties are not allowed to run in both elections. Ekeli, 437–39. 
130 Ekeli acknowledges both these problems, but does not provide any solutions. Ekeli, 439–41. 
131 Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future 
Generations,” 27. 
132 Jones, O’Brien, and Ryan, “Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making,” 3. 
133 Shoham and Lamay, “Commission for Future Generations in the Knesset: Lessons Learnt,” 247. 
134 Alon, “Bill Would Abolish Future Generations Commissioner.” 
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had left the Knesset when the future of the Commission was discussed.135 Secondly, many 
politicians believed that “the Commission received too much authority to interfere in their 
work”136, especially because the Commission’s positions and proposals were often “contrary to 
the preferences and interests of certain parties”137. Lastly, they lacked a clear mandate, which 
made them struggle with questions of how to define future generations138 and their interests139? 
In Hungary, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations had more public 
support, as it was initiated in 2000 by a NGO, but it took a few years, before it got political 
support. 140 It got political power from the constitutional “right to a healthy environment”141, 
which gave it the right to “preserve the quality of the natural environment for future 
generations” and “to provide institutionalized protection for the living conditions of future 
generations”.142 The Commissioner could suspend the execution of administrative decisions if 
that would result in irreversible damage to the environment, bring organisations to court that 
harm the environment and participate in all “administrative and judicial review procedures” to 
appeal decisions that threaten the environment.143 This institution was very successful, but was 
strongly weakened after the right-wing party of Viktor Orbán won the elections.144 
A third, and more recent, example is the Welsh Future Generations Commissioner 
(2016)145, which was a part of the much broader Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act.146 
 
135 Shoham and Lamay, “Commission for Future Generations in the Knesset: Lessons Learnt,” 244. 
136 Teschner, “Official Bodies That Deal With the Needs of Future Generations and Sustainable 
Development: Comparative Review,” 3. 
137 Berman and Boston, Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow 
Public Policy and Governance, 330. 
138 They for example decided to include children’s interests. Shoham and Lamay, “Commission for Future 
Generations in the Knesset: Lessons Learnt,” 251–52. 
139 They decided to use the concept of ‘sustainable development’ to describe the interests of future 
generations: “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”. Shoham and Lamay, 253–57. 
140 In 2006, Benedek Jávor, currently a Hungarian member of European Parliament, wrote an article to 
discuss the details of this law proposal, yet he then observed that “there is hardly any chance of its 
realisation in the short run”. Yet, it got suddenly accepted only a year later. Jávor, “Institutional Protection 
of Succeeding Generations - Ombudsman for Future Generations in Hungary.,” 282. 
141 Fülöp, “Comprehensive Summary of the Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Future 
Generations of Hungary 2008-2009,” 9–10. 
142 Ambrusné, “The Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations of Hungary and His Impact,” 19. 
143 Ambrusné, 21. 
144 It became a deputy function behind the new Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, but as Sánder Fülöp 
argued, this “would create an absolutely insignificant deputy institution” that had no legal tools, was not 
independent and could not protect future generations. JNO, “The Opinion of the Hungarian Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Future Generations about the Draft Act on the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights.” 
145 Although this is a recent institution, it has a long history. The British Labour government (1997-2010) 
established a Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), which reported to ministers instead of 
parliament (for more on this, see Berman and Boston, Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic 
Institutions for a Better Tomorrow Public Policy and Governance, 331–37). When the SDC was stopped, 
Wales decided to install a Commissioner for Sustainable Development, Peter Davies. He then lobbied for a 
new law that was accepted in 2015 and in which this new institution was created. 
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This Commissioner could be “highly influential in ensuring [the] observance [of legal duties] and 
holding public bodies to account”147, especially as it is embedded robustly in Welsh legislation. 
Since this law has been passed only recently, it is difficult to analyse it properly, but we can 
already see some concerns. Firstly, the Welsh government has only “restricted powers and 
responsibilities”148, as the most important decisions are made on a UK-level.149 Secondly, we 
already see public opposition as the Welsh businesses criticised the institution recently for 
opposing a planned relief road.150 Lastly, there are worries that election cycles could constrain 
long-term thinking and that the budget is low, which might lower the effectiveness.151 
 
4.3 POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND THE BOOTSTRAP OBJECTION 
As all these case studies show, the major obstacles to a strong external representative are the 
creation of public and political support; furthermore, they faced problems due to a limited 
budget (desideratum III.) and an unclear mandate (desideratum VI.). As I mentioned in §4.1, this 
lack of political support, was the reason why some opted for weaker forms of representation. 
The idea is that the more political power (desideratum I.) an institution has, the more politically 
infeasible it will become. The Bootstrap Objection holds that if we assume that our current 
democracies are short-termist, it is impossible for the same democracies to adopt future-focused 
proposals? The idea that “existing democracies could be both the cause of, and solution, to the 
very same problem” is “like thinking that one can pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps”.152 
However, I do not agree that this is a logical inconsistency, as I believe that the cause and 
the solution are actually not the same. Short-termism in politics does not mean that democracies 
block all future-focused policies or that they cannot support future-focused institutions; it only 
implies that there are institutional mechanisms that make them focus on the short-term. 
Therefore, it is possible for a democracy to be short-termist, but to support future-focused 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
146 It also included the incorporation of sustainable development in legislation, seven statutory ‘well-being 
goals’, several obligations for public bodies and ministers, and the establishment of public service boards 
in each Welsh local area to prepare ‘local well-being plans’. Berman and Boston, 280. 
147 Davies, “The Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—A Step Change in the Legal 
Protection of the Interests of Future Generations?,” 175. 
148 Berman and Boston, Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow 
Public Policy and Governance, 281. 
149 It is not entirely surprising that such an institution was founded in Wales and not England, as Welsh 
politics has “a more prominent strand of environmental and social awareness” and their environmental 
political agenda is focused more on long-term issues, like “waste reduction and renewable energy”. Jones, 
O’Brien, and Ryan, “Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making,” 6. 
150 Meechan, “CBI Wales Criticises ‘Negative’ Future Generations Commission.” 
151 Davies, “The Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—A Step Change in the Legal 
Protection of the Interests of Future Generations?,” 175. 
152 Kates, “Justice, Democracy, and Future Generations,” 514. 
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institutions; one who always immediately finishes a bag of toffees, can, knowing they are not 
good for him, disallow himself to buy this bag. Tackling short-termism is thus not the same as 
‘pulling oneself up by one’s own bootstraps’, but rather a self-binding mechanism as we know 
that our common tendencies are not in the interest of future generations. Altogether, I might still 
be difficult to reform our democratic system, but it is not structurally impossible. 
Having established that strong external representation is not structurally infeasible, I 
need to define what it means for a proposal to be feasible. I will adopt the conception of 
feasibility as proposed by Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith; it is “a fine line between 
possibility (…) and likelihood”153 and “we should be weary of both naive idealism and 
conservative realism”154. They argue that philosophers should avoid utopian proposals, but it is 
just as problematic to “confuse feasibility with unconditional likelihood”155 as this would hinder 
any political progress. Thus, for a solution to be feasible, does not imply that it will be adopted, 
but only that its chance of success is high enough to pursue it. 
There are at least three possibilities to deal with question of feasibility: ignore, concede 
or integrate. Firstly, we could simply ignore the issue of political feasibility and claim that it is 
theoretically right, but this thesis aims to solve a practical problem and thus I believe that an 
account of feasibility is necessary. Secondly, based on the case studies in §4.2, we could conclude 
that major reforms will always face strong opposition and might never be feasible and thus opt 
for weaker proposals, as “a small step forward is better than no step at all”.156 But this is like 
“surrendering in the face of a morally rotten status quo”157; if we really care about our moral 
obligations, we need to integrate strong external representation with an account of feasibility. 
But what do I need to prove, to show that there is an accessible strategy to get political 
support for a strong external representative.158 As we established above, there are no logical 
 
153 She further explains: “The feasible does not extend to everything and anything that could possibly be 
done, because that would leave in too many unrealistic recommendations. But neither does it extend only 
to what probably will be done, because that would leave out too many aspirational recommendations.” 
Lawford-Smith, “Understanding Political Feasibility,” 256. 
154 He continues: “The first [naive idealism] surfaces when we pursue outcomes that are desirable but 
whose feasibility is extremely low, and the latter [conservative realism] surfaces when we surrender to a 
morally rotten status quo, taking as fixed what we could change through lucid action.” Gilabert, “Justice 
and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach,” 6. 
155 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility. A Conceptual Exploration,” 817. 
156 Jones et al. describe the dilemma that “futures institutions with more power than politically acceptable 
have been quickly abolished, while those which are politically tolerable are not powerful enough to make 
the kinds of truly transformational changes required to protect future generations.” Jones, O’Brien, and 
Ryan, “Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making,” 8. 
157 Gilabert, “Justice and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach,” 1. 
158 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith categorise the question of political feasibility in three different stages. 
Firstly, we have the formulation and defence of the core principles, that could only be infeasible by means 
of hard constraints, i.e. that it is logically impossible. Secondly, we have the implementation of the 
principle, in which we look at soft constraints, like “economic, institutional, and cultural” reasons to 
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impossibilities (hard constraints) to make it infeasible, but there are institutional reasons (soft 
constraints) that will make it less feasible. In order to weigh this feasibility, we need to compare 
accessibility considerations with “the moral significance of the desired end and means of 
achieving it”; when a proposal is very desirable, we accept lower levels of feasibility to still make 
it worth pursuing. Since I have already advocated the desirability of my proposal, the burden I 
have here, is to show that the feasibility of this proposal is high enough to be fighting for.159 
I cannot prove the ‘unconditional likelihood’ of strong external representation, but I will 
give four reasons why I believe it is reasonably feasible. Firstly, §4.2 discussed the creation of 
similar institutions and thus it is likely that other countries could do the same.160 Secondly, the 
environmental problems are worsening and thus we are coming closer to a situation of crisis; in 
those situations people are more open to “envisaging deeper political projects” and “to revise 
their normative commitments”.161 Thirdly, “we should focus not only on what is immediately 
feasible, but also on the long-term and on our role in shaping it”162. If we continue fighting for a 
cause, it might get political support and this is easier achieved if it remains on the table. 
Fourthly, we could influence “the beliefs and attitudes people happen to have”163 in order to 
improve the public support for a proposal.164 This could be done by advocating its desirability 
amongst the public or by showing that it is democratically legitimate – as this thesis aims to do. 
Creating support for the desirability of the proposal, could also give positive ‘feedback effects’.165 
Historically, we have seen major paradigm shifts that many would have hold to be 
infeasible for a long time, such as the abolition of slavery or equal rights for women. Therefore, 
we should never assume proposals to be infeasible, but neither should we ever assume proposals 
to be easily adoptable. I felt obligated to defend the feasibility of my proposal of strong external 
representation, but that does not oblige me to show its unconditional likelihood, rather the 
chance of success in relation to its desirability. This section provided four reasons why there is a 
reasonable chance of success for this proposal to be adopted; in relation with the desirability of 
such an institution, I believe that it is definitely worth pursuing and this makes it ‘feasible’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
determine how feasible (stable) certain proposals are. The third stage, where we look at, focuses on how 
accessible it is to get political support. Lawford-Smith, “Understanding Political Feasibility,” 252–58. 
159 “Sometimes it will be worth pursuing an outcome with low scalar feasibility, because having brought it 
about would be really good”. Lawford-Smith, 254. 
160 One could object that these case studies had a lower level of political power, which made them easier to 
adopt, but I would argue that this is only a small difference – they were quite powerful already. 
161 Gilabert, “Justice and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach,” 38. 
162 Gilabert calls this dynamic duties . Gilabert, 32–33. 
163 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility. A Conceptual Exploration,” 817. 
164 Jones et al. see this perceived legitimacy as a ‘key factor’ in the success of an institution. Jones, O’Brien, 
and Ryan, “Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making,” 6. 
165 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith explain that “if we think that a proposal is extremely desirable, it may end 
up being more feasible just because we will pursue it much more vigorously than other alternatives.” 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility. A Conceptual Exploration,” 816. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
To disprove the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma from Chapter 3, this thesis aimed to provide 
an proposal of a future-focused institution that was both democratically legitimate as effective. 
Chapter 3 argued why the representation of future generations can be democratically legitimate. 
This chapter added that the concept of strong external representation is also effective in fulfilling 
our moral obligations to future generations and that there is a feasible strategy to implement 
such an institution. I hope that this will help strengthen the pursuit of creating such institutions 
and thus I will add a few suggestions to make these institutions more stable or more accessible. 
Firstly, strong external representation already presupposes political power, future-
focusedness and autonomy (desiderata I.-III.). In Chapter 3, I argued that we should not give 
every future individual a vote, but that we should allow representatives for future generations to 
veto laws that have a strong negative impact on their expected well-being. This power should not 
be used lightly, but I believe that we are democratically obliged to ensure that in these extreme 
cases, future generations have the possibility to, via their representatives, stop this law. In 
addition, the institution should be financially independent and have enough resources. It could 
also be worthwhile to allow the representative to deal with individual cases, as this might both 
give the institution more public support as help reveal systemic problems.166 
Secondly, when this institution has powerful tools, its stability is dependent on the 
mandate it has gotten to define these tools (desiderata IV. & VI.). A very specific mandate should 
define ‘future generations’, a principle of equal respect, the tasks of the institution and the legal 
tools for executing these tasks; this specificity might also decrease the “risk of opportunism”167. 
A second question is the broadness of the mandate, i.e. should it focus merely on environmental 
concerns or also on other topics. Beckman and Uggla argue for a broader mandate, as this would 
not only make the representative more effective, but would also allow him “to act strategically 
with regard to the choice of issues to raise and promote”168. However, the argument for giving 
this institution stronger tools was based on the idea that future generations should be able to at 
least stop strong negative impacts on their well-being, and this argument mainly works in the 
case of environmental degradation, as there the negative impacts are biggest.169 
 
166 Beckman and Uggla, “An Ombudsman for Future Generations: Legitimate and Effective?,” 130. 
167 González-Ricoy and Gosseries, “Designing Institutions for Future Generations: An Introduction,” 20. 
168 Beckman and Uggla, “An Ombudsman for Future Generations: Legitimate and Effective?,” 127. 
169 Jones et al. argue that any “Future Generations institution should be explicitly mandated to consider 
existential risks arising from technological development, in addition to environmental sustainability.” 
Jones, O’Brien, and Ryan, “Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making.” 
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Lastly, it is essential to build a strong coalition in support of this institution, as there are 
often political enemies but “few friends and defenders”.170 When the institution adopts a 
deliberative process to come to decisions (desideratum V), this would not only allow for different 
opinions, but also involve social partners with the institution and they could end up defending 
the institution. Defending the desirability and legitimacy of such an institution, like this thesis, 
could also help to create more public support. Beckman and Uggla give suggestions on how 
representatives can broaden their support, by focusing on their “communicative competence”, 
by enhancing “the visibility of the institution”, and by “good relations with media outlets”.171 
  
 
170 Berman and Boston, Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow 
Public Policy and Governance, 331. 
171 Beckman and Uggla, “An Ombudsman for Future Generations: Legitimate and Effective?,” 128–29. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This thesis defined and then discussed the Legitimacy-Effectiveness Dilemma, which holds that 
future-focused institutions cannot both be democratically legitimate and effective, as they face 
the Inverse Relation Problem. In answering this Dilemma, this thesis had to make several 
assumptions and in this Conclusion I have included a List of Assumptions (see below) to clarify 
the building blocks of my argument. It is important to note that these assumptions are claims 
that I believe to be reasonable based on the existing literature and the arguments that I have 
given in this thesis, yet I categorise them as assumption as they are too complex to fully and 
properly analyse and defend within the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter 1 clarified the assumption that we have moral obligations to future generations, 
thereby assuming that there is a solution to the Non-Identity Problem and that my conception of 
what we owe future generations could be satisfying. Chapter 2 explained the assumption that 
democratic governments are short-termist by analysing four different sources of short-termism. 
§0 discussed what notion of democratic legitimacy I would assume for this thesis. In §3.6, I 
assumed that we can politically represent future generations by adopting a conception of 
representation as advocacy. In  §4.1 I explained why I assume strong external representation to 
be effective and  §4.2 gives some case studies to further support this view. Lastly, §4.3 makes 
clear how I define political feasibility and why I assume that my proposal is feasible. 
 
List of Assumptions 
A1: We do have moral obligations towards future generations 
A1a: There is a solution to the Non-Identity Problem 
A1b: A sufficientarian pattern, molecular metric, and chronopolitan scope 
are satisfying in describing our intergenerational duties 
A2: Democratic governments are short-termist 
A3: Democratic governments are legitimate in exercising authority and their 
decisions are legitimate when made democratically, unless these decisions publicly 
violate justice 
A4: The representation of future generations can be effective 
A5: We can politically represent future generations 
A6: It is politically feasible to institute strong external representatives 
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Based on these assumptions in combination with analytical reasoning, brought me to the 
conclusion that Strong External Representation could be a possible solution to the Legitimacy-
Effectiveness Dilemma as it is both legitimate and effective. As I did not argue that other solutions 
could not solve this Dilemma, I cannot conclude that this is the only solution. To make this a 
successful proposal, the argument for Strong External Representation (see below) that I have 
construed in this thesis is not just founded on premisses of its democratic legitimacy (1) and 
effectiveness in fulfilling our moral obligations to future generations (2), but also explains why it 
is a necessary improvement to the status quo (3) and a feasible solution (4). When I add which 
assumptions support which premiss, the full argument then looks at follows: 
 
Argument for Strong External Representation 
Premiss 1: Strong External Representation is democratically legitimate as both the 
All Affected Interests Principles as the Democratic Values Theory require the 
inclusion of future generations by means of a representative who can stop policies 
that have a strong and significant negative impact on future generations 
(Assumptions 3 and 5) 
Premiss 2: Strong External Representation can be effective in fulfilling our moral 
obligations to future generations (Assumptions 1 and 4) 
Premiss 3: Strong External Representation would be a necessary improvement to 
the status quo, as current governments would not be effective in fulfilling our 
obligations to future generations (Assumption 2) 
Premiss 4: Strong External Representation is a feasible solution (Assumption 6) 
Conclusion: Strong External Representation is a possible solution to the Legitimacy-
Effectiveness Dilemma and can be a successful proposal to implement. 
 
This thesis also provided six desiderata that can be supportive in constructing a strong external 
representative. Political power is crucial for its effectiveness, yet it could be helpful to limit the 
right to veto laws to situations of last resort, when it is the only way to prevent significant 
negative impacts. These representatives also require political and financial autonomy, although 
it would be good to create a broad decision-making process. A precise, externally-defined mandate 
can help guide the work of representatives, especially in combination with a principle of equal 
respect, and it protects the institution against insincerity. Finally, based on the discussion in §4.3 
on feasibility, it would be useful to include a seventh desideratum: a strategy of implementation.  
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